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BRIEF FOR SOCIETY OF AMERICAN
LAW TEACHERS AS AMICUS CURIAE
SUPPORTING RESPONDENTS1
The Society of American Law Teachers respectfully submits this brief as amicus curiae in support of
respondents.
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
Founded in 1973, the Society of American Law
Teachers (“SALT”) is the largest independent membership organization of legal academics in the United
States. Law professors, deans, librarians, and administrators from more than 200 law schools make up
SALT’s membership. Virtually all active SALT members hold full-time positions in legal education.
Central to SALT’s mission is its commitment to
“mak[ing] the legal profession more inclusive and
reflective of the great diversity of this nation.” SALT
understands that the most effective way to make
collegiate, graduate, and professional academic programs more representative of our Nation’s diverse
populations is to utilize holistic admissions processes

1

Letters from the parties providing blanket consent to the
filing of amicus briefs are on file with the Clerk of the Court. No
counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and
no party or counsel for a party made a monetary contribution
intended to fund the preparation or submission of the brief. No
person other than amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel
made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission
of this brief.
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that incorporate race consciousness as one of many
factors. Since the Court’s decision in Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), positive steps toward
diversity have been realized, but African Americans
and Latinos, in particular, remain woefully underrepresented at all levels of higher education. Until
this imbalance is corrected, race-conscious affirmativeaction programs remain a necessity.
SALT has supported race-conscious admission
policies before this Court in four previous cases. In
1978, SALT filed a brief amicus curiae in support of
petitioner in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In 2003, SALT filed a
brief amicus curiae in support of the University of
Michigan Law School in Grutter. SALT also supported the University of Texas with a brief amicus
curiae in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin
(“Fisher I”), 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013), and, most recently, supported respondents in Schuette v. Coalition to
Defend Affirmative Action, Intergration and Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equality By Any Means
Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
SALT’s support of diversity in legal education has
not been limited to the filing of briefs amicus curiae.
It has organized many scholarly conferences; supported studies of bias in standardized testing, including the LSAT and state bar exams; created programs
to mentor diverse minorities, including young academics, law students, and potential law students; and
led efforts to assure financial support for low-income
law students. SALT also recently submitted a shadow

3
report on Racial Discrimination in the Legal Profession to the United Nations Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (June 30, 2014),
http://www.saltlaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/
June-30-SALT-FINAL-to-CERD-2.pdf.
The issues raised in the present case are of particular concern to SALT and its membership. Although
this case is focused on undergraduate admissions,
SALT recognizes that each law school’s ability to
admit a strong and diverse entering class is directly
tied to the pool of available college graduates. A ruling against the University of Texas will be followed by
public universities across the Nation. If universities
throughout the country are forced to abandon raceconscious admission programs, the number of racially
diverse undergraduate students will decrease dramatically. In turn, the pool of graduates entering the
legal profession, government service, and positions of
leadership in the private sector will not reflect the
diverse talents, resources and capabilities of this
Nation.

4
INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
For nearly four decades, this Court has held that
race-conscious admissions policies satisfy the Equal
Protection Clause when race is employed as “a positive or favorable factor” to “achiev[e] the educational
benefits of a more diverse student body.” Fisher I,
133 S. Ct. at 2417. The Fifth Circuit’s decision is
faithful to that principle and should be affirmed.
The University of Texas selects applicants based
on multiple criteria to secure the numerous educational benefits that come from having an accomplished, diverse, and vibrant student body. Although
many students are admitted based solely on class
rank, others are evaluated holistically to identify
those students whose accomplishments transcend
impersonal measurement. In evaluating the latter
group, the University’s holistic-review program treats
each applicant as an individual, considering each
person’s unique set of experiences, activities, interests, honors, economic circumstances, and race—but
without assigning a fixed weight to any particular
factor.
Such review is necessary to achieve the University of Texas’s educational mission, which includes
providing students a holistically diverse educational
environment. As this Court has explained, holistic
diversity involves more than simply achieving a predetermined racial balance—or fulfilling a quota.
Rather, holistic diversity demands an educational
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environment rich with diversity of viewpoint, diversity of experience, diversity of talent, and—if a school
chooses—diversity of race. In the University’s considered judgment, it could not achieve the educational
benefits of true holistic diversity without modestly
considering race in the context of each individual’s
other attributes, talents, and experiences.
To be sure, the University’s Top 10% Plan
achieved a significant degree of purely numerical racial diversity. But following years of experience with
that program, the University’s expert academicians
concluded that simply increasing the percentage of
minority students did not provide the educational
benefits of holistic diversity. Because individuals of
the same race do not invariably think alike, the
University determined that greater diversity of race
did not invariably translate into greater diversity of
viewpoint, experience, or talent. Accordingly, the
University realized that race-conscious holistic review
was the only workable means of achieving its vision
of true holistic diversity—in both an inter- and intraracial sense. That is precisely the sort of expert
academic judgment to which this Court has virtually
always deferred.
Moreover, the University of Texas did not arrive
at its considered judgment in a vacuum. Rather, like
countless other institutions, the University expressly
relied upon this Court’s long line of decisions affirming—and reaffirming—the wide latitude universities
enjoy to pursue holistic diversity through modest
race-conscious means. To invalidate the University’s
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program now after decades of decisions affirming
similar plans would destabilize American higher education, fatally undermine the academic autonomy of
public universities, and erode the progress already
achieved—and still needed—of greater holistic diversity in higher education and corresponding professions and leadership positions.
ARGUMENT
I.

COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES HAVE A
COMPELLING INTEREST IN ACHIEVING
QUALITATIVE, HOLISTIC DIVERSITY
A. The Court Has Recognized A Compelling Interest In Seeking Diversity’s Benefits

This Court has repeatedly recognized that institutions of higher learning have a compelling interest
in the educational benefits that flow from a diverse
student body.
In Bakke, Justice Powell wrote that a university’s
First Amendment freedom to make independent
educational judgments “includes the selection of its
student body.” 438 U.S. at 311-12 (citing Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment)). Universities
have various ideas how to accomplish their pedagogical objectives. Neal Kumar Katyal, The Promise and
Precondition of Educational Autonomy, 31 Hastings
Const. L.Q. 557 (2003). But it is clear that one way
universities may go about creating an ideal learning
environment is to ensure that the admissions process
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produces a diverse student body. Bakke, 438 U.S. at
311-15.
In Grutter, the Court adopted Justice Powell’s
rationale and held that the University of Michigan
Law School had “a compelling interest in attaining a
diverse student body.” 539 U.S. at 328. The Court
accepted the Law School’s argument that it needed a
critical mass of minority students because of the “substantial” educational benefits that flow from studentbody diversity. Id. at 330; see also id. at 392-93
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“There is no constitutional
objection to the goal of considering race as one modest
factor among many others to achieve diversity.”).
And in Fisher I, the Court accepted and reiterated the rulings in Bakke and Grutter that “obtaining
the educational benefits of ‘student body diversity is a
compelling state interest that can justify the use of
race in university admissions.’ ” 133 S. Ct. at 2417-18
(quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325). Indeed, so long
as programs are “designed to benefit * * * all students, regardless of color, by enhancing diversity,”
this Court’s precedent does not prohibit such policies.
Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1640 (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment).

8
B. The Holistic Diversity That The University Of Texas’s Admissions Program Seeks
Is Exactly The Type Of Diversity This
Court Has Encouraged
Significantly, however, the compelling state
interest that Bakke, Grutter, and Fisher I recognized
is not diversity for diversity’s sake. Rather, diversity
is a tool to further a university’s educational mission.
The Court approved of the use of diversity as a means
to an educational end, not an end in itself.
Thus, courts should defer to a university’s definition of the type of diversity that it needs to attain
diversity’s educational benefits. See Parents Involved
in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,
551 U.S. 701, 792 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (stressing that
universities must receive “particular latitude in defining diversity”). After all, diversity is “idiosyncratic” and “dependent on the eye of the beholding
institution,” not reducible to a simple formula. See J.
Harvie Wilkinson III, From Brown to Bakke 304
(1979). The Constitution does not prescribe any precise manner in which universities must define diversity for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause.
Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2418-20 (noting that the Court
defers on this point to the “experience and expertise”
of educational professionals); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314
(“[A] university must have wide discretion in
making the sensitive judgments as to who should
be admitted.”).

9
For example, in Grutter, the University of Michigan Law School determined that “a ‘critical mass’ of
underrepresented minorities is necessary to further
its compelling interest in securing the educational
benefits of a diverse student body.” 539 U.S. at 333.
The Law School explained that it needed a critical
mass of minority students not because of “any belief
that minority students always (or even consistently)
express some characteristic minority viewpoint on
any issue,” but rather because “diminishing the force
of such stereotypes is both a crucial part of the Law
School’s mission, and one that it cannot accomplish
with only token numbers of minority students.” Ibid.
And this Court deferred to the Law School’s explanation for its need for a critical mass.
Similarly, here, the University of Texas has determined that purely numeric racial diversity—diversity based solely on skin color—is not sufficient to
meet its educational goals. Rather, the University’s
interest is in achieving “holistic” diversity. Race is a
component of that diversity, but only one component.
Such holistic diversity—as opposed to mere skincolor diversity—is precisely the type of diversity this
Court not only has accepted but has essentially
encouraged schools to pursue, emphasizing that individuals of the same race should not be seen as
alike. “In cautioning against ‘impermissible racial
stereotypes,’ this Court has rejected the assumption
that ‘members of the same racial group—regardless
of their age, education, economic status, or the community in which they live—think alike, share the

10
same political interests, and will prefer the same
candidates at the polls.” Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1634
(quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993)).
Indeed, the type of diversity that the University
of Texas seeks through its holistic-review program is
the type of diversity of which Justice Powell spoke in
Bakke. He emphasized that the interest in attaining
the benefits of a diverse classroom “is not an interest
in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified percentage of the student body is in effect guaranteed to
be members of selected ethnic groups.” Bakke, 438
U.S. at 315. Rather, the “diversity that furthers a
compelling state interest encompasses a far broader
array of qualifications and characteristics of which
racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element.” Ibid.
C. Holistic Diversity Produces Profound
Educational Benefits
Extensive empirical data bear out the benefits of
such diversity. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387-88 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (“[T]he objective of racial diversity can
be accepted based on empirical data known to [the
Court].”).2 Indeed, the benefits of such holistic diversity are myriad.

2

See, e.g., Meera E. Deo, Empirically Derived Compelling
State Interests in Affirmative Action Jurisprudence, 65 Hastings
L.J. 661, 686-90 (2014) (showing “how benefits of diversity include improved learning for all students through an opportunity
to hear and learn from people with viewpoints that may differ
(Continued on following page)
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Diversity “enhance[s] classroom dialogue.” Fisher I,
133 S. Ct. at 2418. Because “the process of learning
occurs both formally in a classroom setting and informally outside of it,” students of differing backgrounds often “stimulate one another to reexamine
even their most deeply held assumptions about themselves and their world.” Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661,
704-05 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quotation
marks omitted). Classroom conversations that incorporate diverse perspectives are superior because they
are “personal and related to reality,” and they “make
the conversations livelier.” Meera E. Deo, The Promise of Grutter: Diverse Interactions at the University
of Michigan Law School, 17 Mich. J. Race & L. 63,
100 (2011). Sparking conversation from various
viewpoints is central to the very “business of a university”: fostering that “atmosphere which is most
conducive to speculation, experiment, and creation.”

from their own”); Charles E. Daye, et al., Does Race Matter
in Educational Diversity? A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 13
Rutgers Race & L. Rev. 75-S, 76-S (2012) (“[E]xtensive quantitative and qualitative empirical data support the finding that a
racially diverse law student body provides educational benefits
for students, for their institution, and for society, especially if
there is significant interaction among students from diverse
backgrounds.”); Patricia Gurin, The Compelling Needs for Diversity in Higher Education (Expert Report of Patricia Gurin), 5
Mich. J. Race & L. 363, 365 (1999) (providing statistical data
indicating that “interaction with peers from diverse racial backgrounds,” both in the university classroom and informally, lead
to increased “learning outcomes”).
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Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2418 (quoting Sweezy, 354 U.S.
at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)).
Students “become more open-minded while learning
from classmates from different backgrounds.” Deo,
Promise, supra, at 100.
This is particularly true for law schools, where
few “would choose to study in an academic vacuum,
removed from the interplay of ideas and the exchange
of views.” Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950);
see Meera E. Deo, Faculty Insights on Educational
Diversity, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 3115, 3138-47 (2015)
(discussing results from Diversity in Legal Academia
project). Empirical research on law-school curricula
suggests that “when students include examples from
their own lives in detailing their perspectives, these
contributions go a long way in making abstract legal
theories more concrete and accessible.” Deo, Promise,
supra, at 97-98. Diversity helps ground legal concepts in the “broader social context.” Id. at 100.
Regardless of whether diversity in a law-school classroom changes students’ minds, it allows students to
“see things from different viewpoints and therefore
understand legal issues better.” Id. at 99.
Diversity ameliorates “racial isolation and stereotypes.” Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2418. Without sufficient diversity, “students of color are tokenized,
treated as spokespeople for their race, and not expected to deviate from what others believe the racial
‘norm’ to be.” Meera E. Deo, Empirically Derived
Compelling State Interests in Affirmative Action
Jurisprudence, 65 Hastings L.J. 661, 691 (2014). But
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“having a critical mass of students of color provides
an opportunity for a group’s majority perspective to
be included while also allowing for inter-group diversity and even opposition to what others from within
the racial/ethnic group express.” Id. at 690-91. Diverse educational environments thus promote social
cohesion and dispel prejudices borne of unfamiliarity.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (diversity “promotes crossracial understanding,” and “enables students to better
understand persons of different races” (quotation marks
and brackets omitted)). In doing so, diversity quells
racial hostilities and helps to “bring[ ] about the harmony and mutual respect among all citizens that our
constitutional tradition has always sought.” Grutter,
539 U.S. at 394-95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 788, 797 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (stressing that “[a] compelling interest
exists in avoiding racial isolation” because the Constitution does not “mandate[ ]” that society “must accept
the status quo of racial isolation in schools”).
Diversity also “better prepares students for an
increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better
prepares them as professionals.” Grutter, 539 U.S. at
330. This is particularly true in the legal context
given that “so much of the law requires the ability to
look at problems from multiple angles, in order to
fully understand different experiences and assumptions.” Deo, Promise, supra, at 99. Furthermore, clients are increasingly global, and private law firms
are increasingly international in scope. Deo, Faculty
Insights, supra, at 3146. Studies have indicated that
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diversity in classroom conversations better prepares
students to deal with global clients and colleagues.
Id. at 3146-47; Okianer Christian Dark, Incorporating Issues of Race, Gender, Class, Sexual Orientation, and Disability into Law School Teaching, 32
Willamette L. Rev. 541, 553-54 (1996). Moreover, empirical research has demonstrated that racial isolation in the classroom has negative consequences on
academic performance and is associated with lower
average test scores. Andy Sharma, Ann Moss Joyner,
& Ashley Osment, Adverse Impact of Racial Isolation
on Student Performance: A Study in North Carolina,
22 Educ. Pol’y Analysis Archives, No. 14, at 10 (2014).
Tradition, common sense, and empirical data,
therefore, support the educational value of diversity.
Indeed, race-conscious diversity is merely “an overdue
update of th[e] time-honored concept” that diversity
enriches higher education and “has been, historically,
clearly related to a university’s function.” Wilkinson,
supra, at 281-82, 303. After all, the mission of a
university “is to prescribe the criteria of intelligent
thought and action for a society.” Charles W. Anderson, Prescribing the Life of the Mind xiv (1993). And
because “[s]tudents may be shaped as profoundly by
their peers as by their teachers,” Martinez, 561 U.S.
at 704 (Kennedy, J., concurring), diverse student
bodies directly facilitate civic virtue, racial cooperation, and critical thinking—both within the university and beyond.
See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado,
Intraracial Diversity, 60 UCLA L. Rev. 1130, 1145-46
(2013).
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D. The United States’ International Commitments Support Holistic-Review Programs
The United States, moreover, is not alone in its
use of race-conscious measures. In signing onto the
International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”), the United
States joined a global consensus of 168 other countries that permit “special measures” to achieve racial
equality. See CERD, Art. 1(4) & 2(2), 660 U.N.T.S.
195, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969. Specifically,
CERD encourages “special and concrete measures to
ensure the adequate development and protection of
certain racial groups or individuals belonging to
them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the full
and equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” Id. Art. 2(2). And CERD provides, like
this Court’s jurisprudence, that such measures “shall
not be deemed racial discrimination” as long as they
do not “continue[ ] after the objectives for which they
were taken have been achieved.” Id. Art. 1(4)).
Thus, the United States’ existing commitments in
the global community support holistic-review programs. See Rex D. Glensy, The Use of International
Law
in
U.S.
Constitutional
Adjudication,
25 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 197, 242 (2011) (noting that
international norms support the use of affirmativeaction programs until “the goals of equality have been
fulfilled”); Marjorie Cohn, Essay, Affirmative Action
and the Equality Principle in Human Rights Treaties:
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United States’ Violation of Its International Obligations, 43 Va. J. Int’l L. 249, 251 (2003) (“[A]ffirmative
action treaty mandates constitute not only international obligations, but also constitute a compelling
government interest to support race-based affirmative action programs.”); Jordan J. Paust, Essay, RaceBased Affirmative Action and International Law, 18
Mich. J. Int’l L. 659, 659 (1997) (observing that international law “provides significant affirmation of
the legal propriety of race-based affirmative action”).3
II.

THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS’S INDIVIDUALIZED ADMISSIONS POLICY IS NARROWLY TAILORED TO ATTAIN THE
EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS OF QUALITATIVE, HOLISTIC DIVERSITY

The University of Texas’s holistic-review program
is narrowly tailored to achieve the University’s compelling interest in the benefits of qualitative, holistic
diversity. Strict scrutiny requires that a law “be
narrowly tailored, not that it be ‘perfectly tailored.’ ”

3

See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), GA. Res 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered
into force Jan. 3, 1976 (prohibiting discrimination or distinctions based upon race, color, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status); see also 138 Cong. Rec. 8068-71 (1992) (declaring that
the United States’ obligations under ICCPR “permitted” raceconscious measures that “are, at a minimum, rationally related
to a legitimate governmental objective”).
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Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1671
(2015); see Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 998-99 (1996)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (narrow tailoring requires
that laws be “reasonably necessary to serve a compelling interest”). A race-conscious admissions policy is
narrowly tailored when its consideration of race is
reasonably necessary to “achieve the educational
benefits of diversity,” Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2420,
particularly when that consideration is holistic and
individualized. Race may be considered as one “modest factor among many others,” Grutter, 539 U.S. at
392-93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), when “no workable
race-neutral alternatives” would likely achieve the
university’s particular vision of diversity, Fisher I,
133 S. Ct. at 2420. The University of Texas’s holisticreview program readily satisfies that standard.
A. The University Of Texas’s Admissions
Policy Is Holistic And Individualized
Like many other admissions policies, the University of Texas’s holistic-review policy considers race
as only one modest factor in the context of an individualized assessment of each applicant. For those
applicants not admitted under the Top 10% Plan, the
University evaluates leadership, extracurricular activities, honors or awards, work experience, socioeconomic status, and race in the unique context
of each applicant’s entire experience, Fisher I, 133
S. Ct. at 2415-17, thus benefitting minority and nonminority applicants alike.
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The use of race in this review process is targeted
and narrow. In fact, “the weight given to race in UT
undergraduate admissions is less than that upheld in
Grutter.” Vinay Harpalani, Diversity Within Racial
Groups and the Constitutionality of Race-Conscious
Admissions, 15 J. Const. L. 463, 529 (2012); see also
Pet.’s Br. 8-9 (acknowledging that “race can be determinative only for * * * a small segment of the
freshman class”). The University of Texas’s approach
“ensure[s] that each applicant is evaluated as an
individual and not in a way that makes an applicant’s
race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or her
application.” Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2420 (quotation
marks omitted); see Grutter, 539 U.S. at 392-93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (reasoning that race-conscious
policies are narrowly tailored when “each applicant
receives individual consideration and that race does
not become a predominant factor in the admissions
decisionmaking”); Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 78889 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (reaffirming this principle); Alexander M. Bickel & Philip B. Kurland,
DeFunis Is Moot—The Issue Is Not, 1 Learning & L.
17, 19, 62 (1974) (distinguishing “a racial quota” from
“legitimate affirmative action” and suggesting the
latter may involve “a case where race was used as one
among many factors to determine admission”).
B. The University Of Texas’s HolisticReview Program Is Necessary To Attain
Holistic Diversity
The holistic-review program is necessary to
achieve the University of Texas’s compelling interest
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in qualitative, holistic diversity. While the Top 10%
Plan has achieved a measure of numerical diversity,
it has not been sufficient to achieve the type of qualitative diversity that the University deems central to
its educational mission. As this Court has reaffirmed,
universities need not exhaust “every conceivable raceneutral alternative” in order to satisfy strict scrutiny.
Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2420. Rather, strict scrutiny is
met when universities, after “serious, good faith consideration,” legitimately conclude that they cannot
“achieve sufficient diversity” with “available, workable race-neutral alternatives.” Id. (emphasis added).
Here, the University of Texas implemented its
Grutter-compliant admissions program after trying
for seven years to achieve qualitative diversity with
its Top 10% Plan alone. During that seven-year
period, the University saw increases only in statistical diversity—i.e., the “simple ethnic diversity” that
does not further a “compelling state interest” in
educational diversity. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2418
(quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315). This is not surprising: the Top 10% Plan does not expressly consider
diversity of thought, viewpoint, or experience. See
Harpalani, Diversity Within Racial Groups, supra, at
498-500. While it increases statistical diversity by
automatically admitting the top 10% of students at
high schools where the students are predominantly
minority, that is only one measure of diversity. The
Top 10% Plan leaves out students who may not be in
the top 10% of their graduating class but who the
University may consider to contribute to diversity in
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ways that students admitted through the Top 10%
Plan may not. Thus, after comprehensive, good-faith
consideration, the University determined that a holistic, race-conscious program is necessary to achieve
its vision of qualitative diversity.
Empirical research and lived experience confirm
that purportedly race-neutral admissions programs
are no substitute for holistic programs like the University of Texas’s. See, e.g., Catherine L. Horn &
Stella M. Flores, The Civil Rights Project: Harvard
University, Percent Plans in College Admissions: A
Comparative Analysis of Three States’ Experiences 12,
59-60 (2003); see also Marvin Lim, Percent Plans: A
“Workable, Race-Neutral Alternative” To Affirmative
Action?, 39 J.C. & U.L. 127, 132, 141-62 (2013). In
California, for example, which prohibits affirmative
action, empirical studies have demonstrated that
“class-based affirmative action programs cannot substitute for race-conscious policies at highly selective
American colleges and universities.” William C.
Kidder, Misshaping the River: Proposition 209 and
Lessons for the Fisher Case, 39 J.C. & U.L. 53, 116
(2013). Indeed, although the “correlation between
race and family income” is “strong,” it “is not strong
enough to permit the latter to function as a useful
proxy for race in the pursuit of diversity.” Alan
Krueger, et al., Race, Income and College in 25 Years:
The Continuing Legacy of Segregation and Discrimination 32 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper
11445, June 2005), http://www.nber.org/papers/w11445.
pdf. When coupled with the University of Texas’s own
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experience from 1996 to 2003, these studies underscore the University’s considered judgment that no
“race-neutral alternatives” could “achieve sufficient
diversity” for purposes of UT’s particular “educational
mission.” See Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419-20 (emphasis added).
Petitioner’s argument that race-conscious measures are unnecessary because “UT is one of the most
diverse public universities in the country,” Pet.’s Br.
24, is mistaken in that it focuses on skin color alone.
Universities have a compelling interest in the educational benefits from a diversity of viewpoints—race
being but a single element of such diversity. Contrary
to petitioner’s assumptions, diversity is both “colorconscious” and “color-blind.” Wilkinson, supra, at
304. On the one hand, diversity and holistic review
are inherently race conscious because race is part of
each individual’s unique experience and identity. See
Vinay Harpalani, Narrowly Tailored but Broadly
Compelling: Defending Race-Conscious Admissions
After Fisher, 45 Seton Hall L. Rev. 761, 768-69, 796805 (2015). On the other, diversity is also “colorblind,” because all individuals “are different” and
thus all individuals “can be diverse.” Wilkinson,
supra, at 304.
By “focus[ing] solely on ethnic diversity,” petitioner’s contentions “hinder rather than further attainment of genuine diversity.” Bakke, 438 U.S. at
315. Indeed, it is precisely because “all individuals
of the same race” do not “think alike,” Schuette, 134
S. Ct. at 1634, that the qualitative diversity provided
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by the University of Texas’s holistic-review program
is necessary to supplement the quantitative diversity
achieved by the Top 10% Plan.
C. Purportedly “Race Neutral” Alternatives Do Not Achieve Holistic Diversity
1. The Top 10% Plan is not a “raceneutral” alternative to a holistic
admissions program
Petitioner argues that “there are numerous other
available race-neutral means of achieving” diversity.
Pet.’s Br. 47. She points primarily to the Top 10%
Plan as a race-neutral alternative that has driven
increases in the enrollment of minority students at
the University of Texas. Id. at 10-11.
Contrary to petitioner’s suggestion that the Top
10% Plan is a race-neutral alternative, that plan
does take race into account. As the Fifth Circuit
explained, the Top 10% Plan increases diversity solely
because of the “de facto segregation of schools in
Texas.” Pet. App. 32a-33a; see id. at 33a-38a & nn.98,
101. Texas developed the Top 10% Plan “against the
backdrop of this challenged reality in their effort to
achieve a diverse student body.” Pet. App. 33a. That
is, conscious of the racial makeup in Texas schools,
the Texas political branches devised the Top 10% Plan
as a way to achieve racial diversity, without having to
overtly consider race at the point of admission. Thus,
contrary to petitioner’s assertions, the Top 10% Plan
is a deliberately race-conscious program that merely
moved the consideration of race from the University
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of Texas admissions office to a point earlier in time,
when Texas officials devised the plan.
That the Top 10% Plan actually does consider
race undermines petitioner’s argument that diversity
can be achieved through race-neutral means. And if
race must be taken into account to attain a diverse
class, better to allow schools to do so in the context
of a highly individualized, holistic-review process. A
percentage plan is a blunt instrument that, at least in
Texas, arguably relies more on race than a holistic
admissions program. See Pet. App. 32a-38a. Yet
petitioner agrees that the Top 10% Plan comports
with the Constitution. Pet.’s Br. 47 (arguing that
Texas should “uncap[ ] the Top 10% Law”). If such a
deliberately race-conscious program is Constitutional,
then surely so must be the modest consideration of
race in a holistic assessment of multiple factors that
also bear on the broader diversity needed to achieve
the University’s educational objectives.
2. Holistic admissions programs must
be race conscious, else they are not
truly holistic
There is no dispute that the University of Texas
can perform holistic review for the students not
admitted under the Top 10% Plan. Rather, petitioner
asserts only that the University’s holistic review cannot consider race. But race-blind holistic review
is not only a contradiction in terms, it is infeasible.
See Harpalani, Narrowly Tailored, supra, at 788-90;
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Mario L. Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky, & Angela
Onwuachi-Willig, Judging Opportunity Lost: Assessing the Viability of Race-Based Affirmative Action
After Fisher v. University of Texas, 62 UCLA L.
Rev. 272, 290 (2015); Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I.
Harris, The New Racial Preferences, 96 Cal. L. Rev.
1139, 1146-48 (2008).
To be effective, holistic review must be truly
holistic—that is, it must assess each applicant as an
individual to the fullest possible context of his or her
life, talents, and experiences. Grutter, 539 U.S. at
392-93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). And because it
cannot seriously be disputed that race often provides
critical insight into the lives and experiences of applicants, see Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317-18 & n.51, holistic review is simply not possible without considering
race as one modest factor among many others, see
Barnes, Chemerinsky, & Onwuachi-Willig, supra, at
290-91. Race and culture remain factors of enormous
significance in the totality of one’s experiences. Put
simply, because peoples’ lives are not “color blind,”
neither can a holistic admissions policy be.
As long as schools evaluate more than simply
test scores and grades, the exclusion of race from
consideration is unavoidable as a practical matter.
Carbado & Harris, supra, at 1146-48. Admissions
officers may inadvertently discern an applicant’s race
many ways—via essays, personal statements, activities, as well as “names which are highly correlated
with racial group membership.” Vinay Harpalani,
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Fisher’s Fishing Expedition, 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L.
Heightened Scrutiny 57, 69 (2013). Consider a college application from an individual who lists youth
leadership in his or her African Methodist Episcopal
Church as an activity. Or consider an application
from a first-generation Latina high-school senior
whose personal essay discusses her immigrant parents’ experiences and how she learned to thrive in an
English-dominated culture even though Spanish is
the language spoken at home. If the reader is to conduct holistic review but cannot consider race, the
reader is confronted with uncomfortable choices about
how to handle these applications.
Moreover, if the reader cannot consider race, the
reader would be confronted with an impossible task,
because race affects assessments of individuals consciously or unconsciously, regardless of intentions and
any mandate from this Court. As a result, removing
the term “race” from the cover of an admissions form
does not remove the concept of “race” from the admissions process. Harpalani, Fishing Expedition, supra,
at 69. Social psychology has shown that even when
people are instructed to ignore or disregard certain
information, “they tend to incorporate it into subsequent judgments nonetheless.” Daniel M. Wegner,
et al., Paradoxical Effects of Thought Suppression, 53
J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 5, 6-9 (1987); see also
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Science 1124
(1974). Just as Dostoevsky’s polar bear will occupy
the mind of anyone challenged not to think about it,
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so too will the admonition not to think about race
generate an unspoken preoccupation with that subject. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, Content of Our
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 Stan. L.
Rev. 1161, 1240 (1995).
Accordingly, “eliminating the express consideration of race” would not “eliminat[e] race itself from
the admissions context.” Carbado & Harris, supra, at
1146. Rather, it would simply turn race into an unstated factor that nonetheless would affect admissions decisions but without the transparency and
fairness of including it as an overt factor among many
others.
3. Eliminating consideration of race
from holistic review would penalize
applicants for whom race is central
to their identities and experiences
Despite its seeming neutrality, a rule precluding
consideration of race in a holistic admissions process
would disadvantage applicants for whom race is a
significant part of their application. Like all private
speakers, applicants have a protected interest in
speaking about race and ethnicity (including their
own), and the State generally may not regulate such
speech based on its content. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992). But formally race-blind
policies not only discount expressions of racial identity based on their content, they also disadvantage
applicants whose accomplishments, experiences, and
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talents are best understood in light of their complete
identity, including race. Carbado & Harris, supra, at
1146-52, 1186, 1191-93.
As Bakke recognized, race is integral to the identity and experiences of many qualified applicants.
438 U.S. at 317 n.51 (“[R]ace can be helpful information in enabling the admission officer to understand more fully what a particular candidate has
accomplished—and against what odds.” (quotation
marks omitted)). Indeed, “the life story of many
people—particularly with regard to describing disadvantage—simply does not make sense without
reference to race.” Carbado & Harris, supra, at 1148.
Racial identity provides “a fuller picture” of some
applicants’ backgrounds and thus a clearer understanding of “their merits for admission.” Barnes,
Chemerinsky, & Onwuachi-Willig, supra, at 292-93.
By excluding such details, however, race-blind
policies discourage expressions of racial identity
and favor those “applicants who subordinate or suppress their race.” Carbado & Harris, supra, at 1149.
Such policies destroy the communicative impact of
certain individuals’ achievements and impoverish the
admissions process. See Barnes, Chemerinsky, &
Onwuachi-Willig, supra, at 292-93. In doing so, raceblind policies disadvantage “applicants for whom race
is a fundamental part of their sense of self,” and
privilege those “applicants who (a) view their racial
identity as irrelevant or inessential and (b) make no
express mention of it in the application process.”
Carbado & Harris, supra, at 1148-49.
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To be sure, race-blind policies do not, by their
literal terms, prohibit discussion of race. But such
policies nonetheless tell applicants that only certain
aspects of their identity are worth considering—and
that the State will define for them what aspects will
matter. Ibid. This Court’s decisions do not permit
such intrusions on “the individual’s right to selfdefine.” Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Racial Identity, Electoral Structures, and the First Amendment Right of
Association, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 1209, 1222 (2003); see
also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317-18 (stressing that the
unique qualifications expressed in an individual’s
application must be placed “on the same footing for
consideration”).
Indeed, just as individuals may not be “forced to
live under a state-mandated racial label,” Parents
Involved, 551 U.S. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring),
neither should they be forced to endure a statemandated label that overtly devalues their racial
identity, see Carbado & Harris, supra, at 1213-14.
“Under our Constitution the individual, child or
adult, can find his own identity, can define her own
persona, without state intervention.” Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
After all, “the right to define one’s own concept of existence” and “personhood” would be meaningless were
such views “formed under compulsion of the State.”
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (quotation marks omitted). Yet this is precisely what
petitioner seeks, by requiring applicants to public
institutions of higher learning to eliminate or mask
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their race when presenting their individual “personhood” for consideration for admission. Regardless of
whether the Constitution permits such an imposition,
it certainly cannot be read to require it. See Bartlett
v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 25 (2009) (plurality op.)
(reasoning that it would be a sad “irony” if the Equal
Protection Clause “were interpreted to entrench
racial differences”).
III. EVEN IF THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS’S
PLAN IS NOT NARROWLY TAILORED, CONSIDERATION OF RACE MUST BE PERMITTED IN OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES
Regardless of what the Court decides about the
University of Texas’s holistic-review admissions policy, this Court should reiterate that other institutions
of higher learning—particularly law schools and
other professional schools—may be permitted to consider race in admissions, as this Court held in Bakke
and Grutter.
As discussed in Part I.C, law schools have a
particularly compelling interest in having diverse
student bodies. As amicus’s members can attest from
experience, legal doctrines take on new meaning
when applied in different contexts, and student diversity significantly helps students understand legal
issues from different perspectives. Moreover, law
schools must train students to see legal issues from
all sides, in order to strengthen the quality of their
arguments. And law schools must prepare students
for an increasingly global and diverse world.
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But percentage plans do nothing to further graduate and professional schools’ compelling need for
diversity because such schools do not draw students
from a fixed geographic area in which the racial
makeup of schools is highly concentrated. Thus, even
if the University of Texas’s percentage plan is deemed
an adequate “race-neutral alternative,” this Court
should not disturb the fundamental rule of Bakke and
Grutter. Race-conscious admissions policies may still
be necessary to achieve diversity at many, if not most,
law schools and other institutions of higher learning.
Because diversity is nuanced and many faceted,
the blunt tools of a percentage plan cannot alone
achieve meaningful educational diversity in all circumstances. Different universities in different states
must be free to tailor their admissions programs to
meet their own demographics, financial resources,
and educational objectives. Courts are not equipped
to fashion these policies, and the judicial process is
not equipped to evaluate such policies on an ongoing
basis, as universities can and must. See Parents
Involved, 551 U.S. at 798 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(noting the importance of “the creativity of experts”
and “administrators” in “continuing the important
work of bringing together students of different racial,
ethnic, and economic backgrounds”).
Fidelity to precedent is particularly salient here
given the reliance interests at stake. Law schools
and universities across the Nation have indisputably
adopted race-conscious policies partly in reliance
on this Court’s decisions in Grutter and Bakke. See
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Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2416; Pet.’s Br. 48 (acknowledging that the University of Texas, like many schools,
understood Grutter to permit “incorporation of race
into admissions decisions as long as the system is
‘holistic’ ”). Public institutions have carefully studied
this Court’s decisions to determine how they could
achieve diversity’s educational benefits while still
comporting with the Constitution’s requirements.
Amicus’s members have been involved in helping to
painstakingly craft law-school-admissions programs
that take race into account without assigning race
any numerical score.
Colleges and universities are ill prepared to develop new strategies for boosting diversity in admissions without considering race. In a recent survey of
admissions directors, only 6% reported that their institution had created a specific plan for how it would
handle admissions if this Court were to limit or ban
considering race in admissions. 2015 Inside Higher
Ed. Survey of College & University Admissions Directors, at 26, https://www.insidehighered.com/system/
files/media/booklet-admission-survey-2015.pdf.
In light of the important reliance interests of
school administrators and professors throughout the
Nation, stare decisis demands that this Court follow
its decisions permitting race-conscious admissions
policies. See Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC,
135 S. Ct. 2401, 2410 (2015).
Indeed, Grutter’s
central holding reflects a stable constitutional rule
that dates back more than 35 years. Since Bakke, it
has been understood that the Constitution permits
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universities to “use race as one factor in deciding to
admit students so long as other factors are also used
in an effort to achieve diversity in the student body.”
Robert J. Bork, A Murky Future, 2 Reg. 36 (1978).
Over time, that decision’s core has been clarified and
refined in the crucible of subsequent decisions, see
Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke’s
Fate, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 1745, 1754-80 (1996), and this
Court’s reaffirmations of Bakke’s core principle have
engendered the reliance of university administrators
and state legislators.
Hence, as petitioner tacitly recognizes, a ruling
against the University of Texas would upend diversity
measures that “have become a standard element of
admissions systems of universities throughout the
country.” Pet.’s Br. 48. As one university president
put it, a decision “that it’s unconstitutional to consider race at all will have domino effects across the
whole country, and will sweep across private universities as well as public ones.” Tamar Lewin & Richard Pérez-Peña, Colleges Brace for Uncertainty as
Court Reviews Race in Admissions, N.Y. Times (July
1, 2015), at A14. Indeed, “[k]nocking out” the University of Texas’s “present system in favor of a strictly
enforced color-blind norm would cause a huge upheaval in a system that” can be better adjusted “by
administrators on campus.” Richard A. Epstein, The
Classical Liberal Constitution 539 (2013).
In addition, stare decisis is not simply a means of
preserving reliance interests; its stabilizing force has
independent constitutional weight. Charles Fried,
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Saying What The Law Is 241 (2004) (reasoning that,
unless “the Court is in fact constrained by doctrine,”
“there is no constitutional law; there are only constitutional decisions”). As Justice Powell stressed in
Bakke, the “consistent application of the Constitution
from one generation to the next” is “a critical feature
of its coherent interpretation.” 438 U.S. at 299.
Constitutional decisions take “root[ ] throughout the
community” and provide “continuity over significant
periods of time.” Ibid. Accordingly, this Court “ha[s]
always required” a “special justification” for overruling constitutional precedent. Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U.S. 428, 443-44 (2000).
But here, no special justification exists for overruling the central principle of Bakke and Grutter.
As many have noted, Bakke stands as a “superprecedent” in that (1) “[i]t is a well tested precedent
in court,” (2) “it has become the foundation for legal
doctrine,” and (3) “there has been substantial societal
reliance in the U.S. and even abroad.” Mark S.
Kende, Is Bakke Now a Super-Precedent and Does it
Matter? The U.S. Supreme Court’s Updated Constitutional Approach to Affirmative Action in Fisher, 16
U. Pa. J. Const. L. Heightened Scrutiny 15, 24 (2013).
Thus, given the “venerability” of Bakke and “the
difficulty of changing, or even clearly identifying, the
intervening law that has been based on [it],” this
Court should affirm that decision and its progeny. Cf.
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 34 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and in respondents’ brief, the Fifth Circuit’s judgment should be
affirmed.
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